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RESUMEN
Este artículo ofrece una perspectiva sobre el desarrollo reciente
de la bioética, un campo en el que es habitual distinguir entre hechos
y valores. Examinando cómo se usa la palabra valor en la ética
biomédica más extendida internacionalmente, se muestra que
algunos usos refuerzan cierta tendencia esencialista a tratar los
valores como si fueran entidades independientes. Como ilustración
y explicación de la creciente importancia de este fenómeno,
describimos el lenguaje de los valores en la obra reciente de
Diego Gracia, mostrando cómo su propuesta metodológica para la
bioética emplea la dicotomía entre hechos y valores, y analizándola
en relación con la de George Khushf para articular el debate sobre
los conceptos de salud y enfermedad. Concluimos sugiriendo una
manera alternativa de concebir los valores que permita superar
esa dicotomía.
Palabras clave: hecho, valor, ética biomédica, normativismo,
naturalismo.
ABSTRACT
This article offers a perspective on recent developments in bioet-
hics, a field in which the distinction between fact and value is
pervasive. By surveying how the word value is used in prin-
ciple-based, mainstream biomedical ethics, it is shown that some
uses enforce an essentialist tendency to speak of values as free-
standing entities.As an illustration and explanation of the increas-
ing pervasiveness of this language, both in English-speaking and
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Spanish-speaking bioethics, we describe the role of value talk in
recent writings by Diego Gracia.We focus on how his proposal of
a methodology for bioethics uses the fact/value dichotomy, and
analyse his position in relation to the agenda for the debate on the
concepts of health and disease proposed by George Khushf. As a
conclusion, we suggest an alternative way of thinking about val-
ues in order to overcome the dichotomy.
Keywords: fact, value, biomedical ethics, normativism, natural-
ism.
1. Introduction
Despite V. R. Potters original coinage of the term bioethics in 1970 to
refer to a bridge between science and the humanities, today it is often under-
stood to relate to some version of biomedical ethicsmost commonly, that of
T. Beauchamp and J. Childresss Principles of Biomedical Ethics (fifth edi-
tion, 2001). Potter came to define bioethics as a global integration of biology
and values, designed to guide human survival (Whitehouse, 2003). This defi-
nition seems to rely upon an unrealistic vision of pre-1970s biology as a value
free science, to which values had to be somehow added for the benefit of
humankind. But this visionrooted perhaps in the idea that physics should be a
model for the rest of scienceis not a good basis for present or past biology, or
any other science directly dealing with human lives, as it has become agreed
that values enter into the process of science long before decisions are made
about technical applications of scientific knowledge (Dupré, 1993, 245). Thus
some authors argue that we have entered a postmodern era, in which the ro-
bust role played by values in framing accounts ofmedicine is recognized (Veatch,
2006; Engelhardt, Garrett & Jotterand, 2006, 566). However, it is still held that
bioethics brings the language of values and disvalues (Gracia, 1995, 205) to a
mainly factual, evidence-based medicine.
In this paper we analyze themeaning, justification and role of value talk in
bioethics, particularly in relation to principle-based accounts. We proceed by
surveying how the word value is used by Beauchamp and Childress in their
classical book, and argue that some of those uses are more problematic than
others. We are skeptical of the essentialist tendency to speak of values as
entities, as if they could exist outside actual processes of evaluation. As an
illustration and explanation of the increasing pervasiveness of this language,
both in English-speaking and Spanish-speaking bioethics, we describe the role
of value talk in recent writings by Diego Gracia, arguably the most influential
philosopher of medicine in Spain. We focus on his proposal of a methodology
for moral deliberation, and describe his position in relation to the normativism
proposed byGeorgeKhushf.As a conclusion, we advocate a stronger normativistAN
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position, one that rejects the fact/value dichotomy. The factual and the evalua-
tivethemedical and the non-medical, the old and the neware not separated
in bioethics, nor should they be.
2. Value talk in bioethics
The index to Beauchamp and Childresss Principles does not include an
entry for the word value. However, the word is used in that book in at least
four different ways:
1. The value of events, attitudes, actions, and so on. Here we
find expressions such as the value of protecting autonomy (99),
the value ofmoral integrity (35), or the value of privacy (296).
In general, models and theories in bioethics put different value on
different things (62); value is attached to the occurrence or pre-
vention of certain events (195), and this value can be therapeu-
tic or not (352).
2. The value of a person or human life. Beauchamp and Chil-
dress write of the patients value for society (127), the value
of the life for the person who must live it (103), and the value
of that patients life for others (137). Human lives can have
social value and even economic value (207). There could
even be lives with no value (145).
3. Personal, group, and societal values. Here we find expres-
sions such as a particular persons choices or values (66), the
patients views and values (100), or the entrenched values and
goals of medical professionals (82). Values are not only held by
individuals, as Beauchamp and Childress also write of the va-
lues of the general public, the values of people who have or
have had a particular disease (213), and the shared values of a
group (233).
4. Values embedded in judgments, assessments, and treatments.
Finally, Beauchamp and Childress argue that a key concept such
as that of medically indicated treatments presupposes values
(139); that risk-benefit analysis and other adjudication methods
are not value-free (206), and that their resolution will depend
on the value judgments of the decisionmakers.At bottom, they
say, bioethical debates are often debates about goals, and dispu-
tes about appropriate goals involve conflicts of values (193).
This classification can be reduced to a simpler one, in which groups 1 and 2
are about values in the possessive sense of the word, while values in the groups
3 and 4 are understood in an entitative sense. In the first sense, value indicates
a certain property or relation of something (be it an event, attitude, goal, person, FA
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etc.). According to this use, value is attached to something: something has
value. This is the traditional, economic, and possessive meaning of value. In
the second sense, when Beauchamp and Childress write of the values of a
given human group (patients, healthcare professionals, or society at large), or
that something is a value, they are using a relatively new (appeared only 130
years ago), philosophical, and entitative meaning of the term, the one we use in
phrases like justice is a value, science should be value-free, or religious
values are important (Menéndez Viso, 2005).
Groups 1 and 2, then, are about values in the possessive or relational sense
of the word (X has value), while value in 3 and 4 is used in the entitative or
free-standing sense (X is a value). The distinction between these uses of the
word is relevant to bioethics because of at least the following considerations.
When we say that something is a value, further arguments are often re-
duced to discussing whether that is or is not the case. But when we say that
something has value, a plurality of arguments emerge, expressing the different
relations that the thing in question might have with the other things that is com-
pared to in order to ascertain its value. For instance, when Beauchamp and
Childress discuss the best interests standard (103), they make a distinction
between the value of a persons life for herself vis-à-vis the value of her life for
other persons.
When we talk of values as entities, it is easy to be essentialist, and think of
them as Platonic ideas. As John Dupré puts it, the existence of such real
essences would imply that there is some unique, privileged scheme of classifi-
cation, which assigns everything to a class defined by common possession of
the appropriate essence (1993, 60). If health is a valueeven if not our only
value or goal, as Beauchamp and Childress write (251)then it seems as if it
was always the same kind of thing, as if we already knew what it really is. But
if we begin by saying that health (or different conceptions of health, because
there are many and diverse) has value, it follows that it will have different
value to different people.
When talking about values in the entitative sense, questions about hierarchy
appear. If care is a value and so is dignity then sometimes it is impossible to
realize one without neglecting the other, and the discussion revolves around
which value will have priority, which one is the real value that one has to maxi-
mize (as in Beauchamp and Childress extreme reification of value in their
discussion of utilitarianism, 341-348). But if we think that care has a value and
that so has dignity, those values could fluctuate without having to presuppose
that care or dignity should override one another. This way we would not con-
strue the problematic cases as a conflict of values, but rather as a complex
process of different evaluations over time.
In short, we favor possessive uses over entitative ones because the former
do not commit us to any given hierarchy of values.As with any other ontology,
a given axiological hierarchy can always be disrupted by the promiscuous real-AN
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ity of human values, and ensuing discussions tend to make little headway. To
speak of values in the possessive sense does not presuppose a fixed axiological
and ontological order, and arguments can get started without prior agreement
on what values are at stake, or on what values are at all.
3. An example: conflict of values in Spain
The Spanish film The Sea Inside (Mar adentro) won the 2005 OscarAward
for best foreign film. Directed and co-written byAlejandroAmenábar, The Sea
Inside is based on the real life case of Ramón Sampedro, a former sailor who
broke his neck and spent more than 25 years as a quadriplegic. On several
occasions the Spanish courts denied his claims for the legalization of assisted
suicide, and he died on January 12, 1998, by sipping a solution of cyanide through
a straw (Guerra, 1999). In a scene of this film there is a heated argument with
a catholic priest, Father Francisco, who argues that life-denying freedom is
not freedom. To this, Ramón answers that a life without freedom is not a life
either.
This is clearly not the best way to discuss topics in bioethics. In general,
human beings value life and liberty, and we can say (in the entitative sense) that
life and freedom are human values. However, if we frame Ramóns case in the
terms represented in the quoted piece of dialogue, as a conflict of incommensu-
rable or mutually exclusive values (life and freedom, in this case), there is no
way of advancing the discussion further. This is exactly what happens in the
film: the argument between Ramón and Father Francisco ends without mutual
understanding, and Ramón gives up hope in finding a solution to his problem
through public discussion.
However, the possessive or relational use makes the situation clearer.
Ramóns life has a value for him, but not enough, because he also values free-
dom, and he considers himself to be a prisoner in his own body. Father Fran-
cisco values freedom, too (he is also a quadriplegic, but uses a state-of-the-art
wheelchair with the help of a couple of personal assistants), but for him human
life has a higher value.
This might sound obvious, but nevertheless provides a way out of the cul-
de-sac in the argument between Ramón and Father Francisco. When someone
says that Ramóns life has a value, he or she is not simply describing his life, but
measuring it by a scale, comparing it with other instances of human life. It is
easy to realize that this value might change over time, depending on the terms
of comparison (Menéndez Viso, 2005, 181-182). Thus pluralism is introduced,
something that was absent in the dilemma life without freedom vs. freedom
without life, in which the (impossible) task was to find out which one of the
two was the real value that had to prevail.
Still, the entitative use is prevalent today. For instance, value talk is in-
creasingly fashionable in Spanish bioethics, as can be seen in the methodology
of biomedical ethics proposed by Diego Gracia, which we will examine now. FA
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Ten years after Beauchamp and Childress published the first edition of
their Principles, Gracia published his own Fundamentos de bioética (1989), a
book that brought the four principles approach to Spanish bioethics. He is con-
sidered a paradigm case of the peripheral bioethicist, and has played a deci-
sive part in the introduction and diffusion of contemporary bioethics in Spain
and LatinAmerica (Garrafa, Diniz & Guilhem, 1999).
The key concept of Gracias bioethics is that of deliberation, which he iden-
tifies with a step-by-step procedure that must go through certain established
stages. In order to deliberate on the morally most appropriate course of action,
Gracia (2003, 230-232) proposes amethodology based on the following stages:
1. Check the compliance of the course of action with moral princi-
ples.
a. Analyze the bioethical principles involved in the case.
b. Identify conflicts between values or principles.
2. Evaluate the likely consequences.
a. Evaluate the circumstances of a particular case and the likely
consequences of the decision.
b. Determine if an exception to the principles may and should
be made.
Gracias method thus requires identifying the values in conflict with bioethi-
cal principles or with other values (for Gracia, the principles of bioethics are
human values important for the medical profession, but not the only ones; the
process of deliberation might take into account non-medical values such as
religious beliefs, etc., whichmight conflict with each other). In other words, his
proposal of deliberation first determines the values at stake and then ana-
lyzes possible courses of action according to their ability to realize the identified
values, to finally look at the likely consequences (Rodríguez del Pozo & Fins,
2006, 234).
In 1999, Gracia thought that ethics could be expressed in different, comple-
mentary, languages, including the language of principles and consequences, the
language of virtues and excellence, the language of rights and duties, and the
language of values and disvalues. Because he described the basic morality of
Latin cultures as a version of virtue ethics, Gracia thought that a principlistic
approach could be of most help in avoiding some traditional defects in those
cultures, like paternalism, lack of respect for the law and lack of tolerance
(1995, 205).
Of course, there are other reasons than those in order to favour a principle-
based approach to bioethics. Because values could be too vague, and rules too
specific, Beauchamp and Childress chose a language of principles in order to
mediate between general values and particular rules. Both principles and rules
are general norms that guide actions, but rules are more specific in contentAN
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and more restricted in scope, while principles leave considerable room for
judgment in many cases. The language of principles steers a middle way,
expressing the general values underlying rules in the common morality (12-
13) and thus providing reasons in order to justify a course of action.
Principles provide reasons for action according to rules and values. Despite
its critics, principles-oriented bioethics remains, themost widely used account
in biomedical ethics (Gert, Culver & Clouser, 2006, 99), the dominant para-
digm and true bioethical orthodoxy (Gracia, 1995, 194). Furthermore, prin-
ciples are meant to be limited in number and reasonably consistent with each
other, being hierarchical or at least capable of informing systems of thought in
congruent ways. In contrast, values are haphazard, incongruent, and numerous
(Shiffrin, 2006, 194). So why, in that case, is there a need to re-introduce values
in the methodology of bioethics?
The first answer is general: values connote pluralism and difference in a
way that principles cannot, and a constellation of values seems to provide a
better description of contemporarymoral life than a set of congruent principles.
AsMartha Nussbaum puts it, the valuable things are plural, and are not reduc-
ible to some one valuable thing of which all other goods are mere functions.
This strongly suggests the possibility of insoluble conflicts of value, for it might
be difficult or even impossible to pursue the entire set of valuable things to
which a moral agent is committed (Nussbaum, 2001, xxix).
A second answer is more local. The Spanish healthcare ethos is becoming
more and more pluralistas is apparent from the way in which contemporary
Spanish film portrays bioethical issues. It is not that, by character or national
idiosyncrasy, Latin people are profoundly uncomfortable with rights and prin-
ciples (Gracia, 1995, 205).What might be happening, rather, is that in a plural-
ist scenario, values, unlike principles, allow freedom from theory-guilt. Em-
phasis on principles implies a need for abstract elegance or symmetry. Empha-
sis on values, on the other hand, allows us to find meaning in stories that
cannot be categorized in systems (Shiffrin, 2006, 194). In such a pluralist,
post-modern scenario, theory loses ground to narrative.
Finally, this pervasiveness of value talk is not restricted to the Spanish-
speaking bioethics community. Leading international journals in the field review
books focusing on the values underlying decision-making processes, hailing them
as examples of how value talk can be productive and effective (Ravitsky,
2006). And the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights quotes many and diverse values, but does not provide a rankingmethod,
something that can lead to quite honest and potentially serious disagreements
(Häyry & Takala, 2005, 232).
4. Facts and values in medicine
In general, this engagement of medicine with values that is often associated
with bioethics might be due to the role which health and illness play in theWest.
Max Weber and other sociologists have argued that medicine plays a special FA
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role in the shaping of social values because civilizations are organized around a
soteriological visionan understanding of the nature of suffering, and the
means of transforming it in order to achieve salvation or health (López, 2004,
877).
Whatever is meant by such vague expressions as our values, medicine is
often at the core of them, and they are inextricably linked with concepts of
health and disease. In particular, critics of Beauchamp and Childress have noted
that the concept of disease is the central concept of medicine and yet, at its
core, it involves values, though what values and to what extent they play a role
in defining the concept constitutes much of the debate in the literature (Gert,
Culver & Clouser, 2006, 129).
Because evaluative language provides reasons for action, science can hardly
dispense with it. Thus the assumption of a sharp fact/value distinction or di-
chotomy is not only untenable but also often harmful. In large areas of science,
the attempt to separate the factual from the normative is futile (Dupré, 2007,
30-31). Is this the case in medicine and health care?Again, we will use Gracias
philosophy ofmedicine as an illustration.
Following a distinction made by Loren Graham (1981), Gracia (1991) dis-
tinguishes between restrictionist and expansionist views on this issue. Restric-
tionists see science as autonomous and separated from values; expansionists
argue that science has unavoidable implications for values and vice versa, and
this is the view that Graham and Gracia judge most reasonable, but one not
without risks of nonmedical values intruding harmfully into medicine. There-
fore, Gracia (1991, 66) argues for a critical expansionism inwhich philosophy
must play a role in medical education so that values can be adequately assessed
and medicine protected.
The development of Gracias bioethics fits well into George Khushfs map-
ping of the agenda for the debate on the concepts of health and disease. These
concepts function in the philosophy of medicine somewhat like demarcation
criteria in the philosophy of science: they mark off the jurisdiction of medical
science. According to Khushf (2007), this debate is crucial to any response to
the current developments in health care, and should be framed philosophically
as one between weak and strong normativists. Weak normativists see values
as integral to health concepts, but share with naturalists a confidence in our
ability to tease out facts from values (2007, 24). Strong normativists are skep-
tical of the demarcation project, think that facts and values cannot be disen-
tangled, and hold that socioeconomic conditions unavoidably influence how pa-
thology is understood.
We have just seen how Gracias methodology presupposes a distinction
between facts and values. Actually, his procedure must start with a detailed
study of the clinical facts, because the clearer these are the more accurate the
identification of value conflicts that will result (Gracia, 2003, 230). There is a
time for discussing the clinical aspects of the medical record (that is, forAN
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setting the facts straight), and a time for determining the values in conflict
with other values or principles. In this limited sense, his methodology shares
one of the features of the naturalist position described by Khushf. However, he
does not believe in a sharp fact/value dichotomy, but thinks that philosophy and
history can help in distinguishingmedical values from those that are nonmedical
(Gracia, 1991, 68-69).
Because he sees values as integral to health concepts, Gracia is best de-
scribed as a normativist. In his latest book, Como arqueros al blanco (2004),
he argues that bioethics and its focus on patient autonomy introduce a new
human right: the individual right to define health and disease. He sees the
increasing importance of patient autonomy in the concepts of health and dis-
ease (that is, the increasing importance of their subjective aspects) as an irre-
versible phenomenon in Western societies. Because this process of emanci-
pation is inevitable, Gracia says, societymust be educated in the normative or
axiological dimension of health (2004, 84-85). Otherwise, the introduction into
clinical practice of the patients own definition of health and disease will carry
arbitrary and harmful consequences.
Gracia is not a social constructivist. He writes that values are supported
by facts (2003, 230), not the other way around, and tries hard to steer a middle
way between the value-free positivistic illusion and the science as politics
position. It is difficult to decide whether his position is a strong normativist one,
in the sense favoured by Khushf. Let us recall that Gracias methodology is
based on a hierarchical ordering of the four principles into two levels, where
compliance with the principles of nonmaleficence and justice belongs to the
public or minimalist ethics, and the principles of autonomy and beneficence
belong to the maximalist or private realm. It could be argued that this distinc-
tion between the public and the private levels depends upon a previous distinc-
tion between two concepts of health, one more naturalist and the other more
normativist. The first concept is used when appeals to nonmaleficence are
made, as they usually rely on an objective, descriptive, more value-free concept
of health (identified with biological life by Gracia, 2003, 231). The second
concept is used when appeals are made to the principle of beneficence, which
works with a subjective, normative, more value-laden concept of health (be-
liefs or life ideals). If this is correct, Gracia works both with a naturalist and a
normativist concept of health, which makes his position difficult to describe.
But nonmaleficence and justice are, in Gracias work, ultimately defined by a
public deliberation process between all members of society. His position is there-
fore a normativist one, even though it does not fully fit in the strong variety
description.
Using his work as representative of mainstream bioethics in Spain and Latin
America, it could be said that Gracias theory favors a fact/value distinction
without a dichotomy, and a normativist concept of health without loss of confi-
dence in the classical distinction between the clinical and the socioeconomic FA
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aspects of health care. It would be interesting to see how Spanish speaking
bioethics faces the global challenges to the practice of health care identified by
Khusfh (2007), such as the overlap between administrators and clinicians, or
the shift of focus to systems-based interventions. To this task we turn now.
5. Rejecting the dichotomy
In a famous expression, the surgeon René Leriche stated that health is life
lived in the silence of the organs (Canguilhem, 1979, 180); that is, we are
healthy as long as we live unaware of our body; once there is something wrong
with an organ, it begins to act up, it breaks the bodily silence and we begin to
experiment ourselves as ill or sick. This classical idea of health, one that can be
traced back to Kant and Descartes, has been rejected in the 20th century, as the
debate in philosophy of medicine over the concepts of health and disease be-
comes a discussion about the proper role of values in medicine and bioethics.
Although the contemporary debate started with an article published in the
journal Philosophy of Science (King, 1954), the most widely discussed contri-
bution is that by Boorse (1975), who argued for a purely descriptive definition
of health as the natural functioning of all the sub-systems of an organism,
which will correspond to statistically normal functioning in a suitable reference
class.Many authors have criticizedBoorses naturalism and its alleged axiological
neutrality: some emphasize the instrumental character of clinical diagnosis, prog-
nosis and treatment (Engelhardt, 1996), while others defend the intrinsically
cultural and political character of disease classification, taking the early work
of Foucault (1961) as an example. In general, these normativist critics argue
that the concepts of health and disease are not value-free.
In this debate, and for reasons explained above, Gracia could be placed as
a normativist. Khushf defends a strong version of this position, one in which
medical theories depend on individual and social conventions and decisions
regarding what we want to treat and how we want to treat it, as well as on the
resources we have for supporting our health systems (2007, 24).According to
Khushf, strong normativists do not think it possible to disentangle factual and
evaluative judgments, but he nevertheless sees the fact/value dichotomy as
manifest in traditional medical science, ethics, and policy. He aptly identifies the
dichotomy at work in two of the most prominent structural features of contem-
porary medicine: the division of labor between administrators and clinicians,
and the role of patient autonomy in health care relationships. In both cases he
warns that we are facing a revolution in health care, in which medicine is being
transformed because of socio-economic factors and in which, as a result, the
fact/value dichotomy becomes increasingly blurred.
Khushf outlines an agenda for this debate over the very soul of medicine
(2007, 26).Wewould like to continue it by arguing that his normativism can be
even made stronger if we avoid free-standing (entitative) uses of value in
favor of a more relational approach. After all, if the fact/value dichotomy is soAN
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pervasive in traditional medicine, would it be good to rely on it in order to map
the new realities of health care?As illustrated above, entitative uses of value
are common in mainstream and peripheral bioethics, and instrumental in creat-
ing this dichotomy, which is generally used but philosophically problematic.
Even though our strategy is different, we share the overall aim of Khushfs
agenda. We do not reject the idea that values are integral to the meaning of
pathology, or that medical standards of care should be open to a broader com-
munal deliberative process. There might be legitimate uses of value talk in
the writings of Gracia, and of Beauchamp and Childress, especially when they
seek to show how diverse cultural, sociopolitical, and economic processes con-
figure our health concepts. What we will seek to show is that the fact/value
dichotomy becomes almost meaningless once we reject some uses of entitative
valuethat some underlying structures that are often taken for granted can
indeed be made explicit, but without recourse to a misleading dichotomy.
Our discussion can be organized around three different areas of debate,
namely: the division of labour between clinical practitioners and administra-
tors of health care; themethodology of bioethical deliberation; and the distinc-
tion between medical and non-medical values, with the related question about
the survival of the older medical values in our present context.
6. Fact/value and the administrative/clinical division
We agree with Khushf that the traditionally deep division of labor be-
tween those who establish the conditions (the administrators) and those who
engage in the practice (the physicians) will become increasingly blurred in the
new context of health care. As he points out, administrators legitimately play a
role in addressing health care quality, and often work with assumptions very
similar to those of physicians (2007, 21).
However, we also think that this division only provides a material embodi-
ment of the fact/value distinction inasmuch as value is understood in the
entitative sense. If we used the word in the older, possessive, sense, it would be
apparent that the main activity of health care professionals (or any other pro-
fession) is precisely that of valuing.
As an illustration, let us look at a process that, according to the traditional
fact/value distinction, is thought to be strictly factual: a blood analysis.A com-
plete blood cell count, one of the most commonly performed blood tests, mea-
sures red blood cells, white blood cells and platelets. What the test gives us is a
list of numeric values, along with judgments about whether those values are
normal or whether they indicate a given condition. Thus in ordinary health care
interactions bodily damage is assessed; the therapeutic value of several treat-
ments is ascertained; different factors such as diet, lifestyle, or genetic makeup,
are evaluated in terms of their impact on the patients condition, and so on and
so forth. When they perform these actions, professionals are valuingvalues
are the result and the means of their work. FA
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The relevant distinction is not, therefore, between facts and values, but be-
tween precise, conclusive, or non-controversially established values (i.e., facts),
and dubious, open or controversial ones.And by values here we do not mean
Platonic ideas, essences, or the kind of things that are understood as such in the
entitative sense, but rather the kind of results that we achieve by processes of
measurement or comparison. Thus every health care professional, the adminis-
trator as well as the clinician, is valuing different things all the time (including
disputed and undisputed facts, of course). Seen this way, there seems to be no
need for the fact/value dichotomy as an epistemological foundation for medi-
cine.
7. Moral methodology in the clinical context
Khushf correctly identifies the current bioethical consensus regarding the
way patient values are to be integrated into medical decision-making. As we
have seen in Gracias method, first the clinical facts are gathered; as he puts
it, [a] goodmedical record is always the basis of a good clinical round, and also
of an ethical round (2003, 230). As potential decision trees emerge (another
step in Gracias method), the physician interacts with the patient to solicit her
values, so that every course of action can be checked against them (as well as
against its likely consequences, and against the principles of bioethics). Eventu-
ally, a decision is taken in accordance with this approach to moral deliberation.
Thus described, this deliberation process relies too much on values in the
entitative sense. If we look at it without recourse to such entities, a different
picture appears, one in which the ascertaining of facts is not previous or exter-
nal to the deliberation of the best course of action. In this alternative picture, the
relevant values (including facts such as test results, treatment survival rates,
patient preferences, etc.) appear in the context of the decision making pro-
cessin the very course of deliberation, not before it. Understood in the pos-
sessive sense, values are never previous to the actual process of moral delib-
eration; rather, they are created, revised andmodified throughout it. Even those
values that are usually (entitatively) called human values, such as life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness, are only manifest to us when we engage in
the moral question about what to do now, in a particular situation in real time,
often bymeans of conversations with family, friends, or health care profession-
als (Árnason, 1994).
The old image of health as life lived in the silence of the organs retains an
element of truth: when we are healthy, we hardly notice it, either as a fact or as
a value; as if health was invisible or silent until the very moment we get ill, or
someone close to us does. The value of health is often (and painfully) only
manifest to those who are already engaged in a clinical relationship. In these
cases, people do not usually go to the clinic with a ready-made, ordered list of
preferences; quite the opposite, such an ordering is often the patients work in
progress.AN
TO
N
IO
C
A
SA
D
O
D
A
R
O
C
H
A
-A
R
M
A
N
D
O
M
EN
ÉN
D
EZ
V
IS
O
257
In his book The Lonely Patient (2007), Michael Stein provides a graphic
illustration of how convoluted and tortuous this decision-making process can
be. After all, the concept of disease is not a simple one. Some authors have
described it as a triad comprising disease, illness, and sickness, these
terms reflecting professional, personal, and social perspectives that concern
biological, phenomenological, and behavioral phenomena respectively (Hoffman,
2002). Steins essays speak of the concept of disease as perceived by the ill
person, the subjective experience of the individual patient. Modern medicine
has sometimes forgotten this concept of illness, focusing instead in the pro-
fessional perspective of disease, while postmodernist criticism has often fo-
cused on sickness (as when Foucault challenged the modern use of the terms
mad and mentally ill as synonyms).
Only after the 1970s, with the rise of bioethics and the patients rights move-
ments, has the critique of modern medicine been directed at its ignorance of the
patients own conception of health. The work of Arthur Frank and others has
thus given rise to a sort of narrative bioethics, which attributes epistemic and
normative primacy to the concept of illness.According to Stein, illness is expe-
rienced by the patient as four complex feelings: betrayal, terror, loneliness, and
loss. Betrayed by his own body, the terrified patient has lost the thread of the
narrative of his life (2007, 91), and the doctors most difficult job is to help him
recover or reinvent his story. In this sense, we are experiencing a paradigm
shift from an evidence based medicine to a narrative based one. Narra-
tive-basedmedicine encourages substituting skills deemed scientificthose
that are eminently measurable but unavoidably reductionistfor those that are
fundamentally linguistic, empathic, and interpretive (Greenhalg & Hurwitz,
1999, 50). As a result, facts and values are not as sharply separated as in the
former paradigm.
8. Old and new medical values
Khushf uses the debate on health concepts in order to point out how the
present transformations in the clinical setting destabilize traditional understand-
ings of medicine and health care. Ultimately, he thinks that the classical medi-
cal ideal cannot be sustained (2007, 25), suggesting that we are indeed experi-
encing a sort of Kuhnian revolution or paradigm shift in biomedical theory
and practice.
Again, this way of thinking is entitative, as it suggests the image of a clash
between some older and some new medical values. However, there is no need
to think in such terms. Health problems are many and diverse; new problems
will need new solutions, but we do not need to equate solutions and values.More
often than not, what are termed medical values are good old-fashioned profes-
sional virtues, or reasons to choose a career in medicine (that is, the internal
goods relevant to this profession). Because suchmedical values are not solutions,
they are not necessarily affected by the emergence of new problems. FA
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Actually, we could even argue that there are no typical facts (or values) of
medicine. As we have seen in the previous section, the concept of disease is
not the exclusive province of health care professionals, because it includes also
illness (the personal perspective) and sickness (the social one).An obvious
example of an allegedly medical value would be the patients life, in potential
conflict with the patients autonomy (another alleged value, especially in those
versions of bioethics in which the principle of respect of autonomy is para-
mount). Here again, the entitative sense of value is at work. If human life is a
value, it is difficult to identify what is at stake in every clinical situation, because
each case, each patient, is reduced to a particular instance of that generic
human life that is a value. But if we stick to the possessive sense and say
instead that (different) human lives have (different) values, it is easier to make
further distinctions and realize that prolonging a particular life may be less valu-
able than other courses, on the basis of medical futility, the patients prefer-
ences, the demands of distributive justice, or on some other consideration.
Another set of candidates to the position of medical values would be those
goals that are proper to medicine, or to the healthcare relationship. This is an
interesting field of enquiry. Between 1992 and 1997, the Hastings Center car-
ried out a well-known international study in order to re-examine those goals and
set up new priorities. The research group settled on four goals:
1. The prevention of disease and injury and the promotion and ma-
intenance of health.
2. The relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies.
3. The care and cure of those with a malady and the care of those
who cannot be cured.
4. The avoidance of a premature death and the pursuit of a peace-
ful death.
Health, cure, care, and a peaceful death are of course valued bymost people,
but again there are problems if we think of them as entities. There is no easy
way of precisely determining when the pursuit of health and cure should give
way to the pursuit of care and a peaceful death.As the Director of the Hastings
project notes, those goals embody potential tensions, especially in the care of
the dying, because the point when a person is considered to be critically ill, or
dying, will in part be a function of the reigning medical and ethical values of a
society, as well as of the available economic resources to respond to that per-
son (Callahan, 1999, 104-105). The subject of the alleged conflict of values
is not and cannot be the health care professional alone, but society at large
(including, of course, the patient). And it is not easy to specify what exactly
those values of a society are that are so fundamental in order to separate life
and death. What is sure, however, is that the facts and values (i.e., the valu-
ing) we uphold when making health-related decisions are not natural, in theAN
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sense that they cannot be described or distinguished without appeal to norms
and cultural standards; rather, they belong to the polis, and as such are inextri-
cably linked to political life.
9. Conclusion
Fact/value is a complicated distinction which at one level is obvious and
important while at others, as we have pointed out, is muchmore problematical.
The main upshot of our analysis is a rejection of naturalist accounts of bioeth-
ics, in which fact and value are neatly divided, in favor of a more relational
approach, in which the dichotomy makes no sense as such. As we have shown
(using Gracias work as an example), value talk is becoming pervasive in the
field; andmany proposals of amethodology formoral deliberation in biomedical
ethics rely on the fact/value dichotomy, much in the sameway classical clinical
method does. However, such dichotomy might be practically dispensable and
theoretically untenablenot only because of the new developments in health
care, as Khushf suggests, but also because of philosophical arguments dealing
with value inquiry.
By separating twomain, but clearly different meanings of the word value,
we suggest that the dichotomy is construed on the prevalence of what has been
called the entitative or free-standing uses. These entitative uses raise problems
of incommensurability and hierarchy, create a gap between administrative and
clinical work, obstruct somemethodologies in the clinical context, and encour-
age an opposition between the new and the old medical values. These difficul-
ties can be avoided, or at least eased, by replacing the entitative meaning with
the possessive use of values. Health care is an activity that generates and
needs manifold values, but does not commit us to any given order of valuable
things.
If concepts so fundamental in the philosophy of medicine as health and
disease are widely accepted to be normative, a newmethodology in biomedical
ethics is needed, one that understands the distinction between fact and value in
ways other than the classical, naturalist one. Gracias proposal represents a
step towards that direction, but further work would be necessary in order to
clarify it.
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